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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-DuE PROCESS-REVOCATION OF PROBATION WITH-
OUT PRIOR HEARING VIOLATES PROBATIONER'S FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL AT
REVOCATION HEARING To BE DETERMINED ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.-
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Gerald Scarpelli, an indigent probationer,' was arrested following
a burglary. After he admitted involvement in the crime, Scarpelli's
probation was summarily revoked 2 and he was incarcerated to begin
serving a previously imposed sentence.3 Scarpelli later sought a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that the state's failure to provide a hearing
and appointed counsel prior to revocation of probation had precluded
consideration of his claim that the admission was given under duress.
4
The District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that
revocation of probation without a hearing constitutes a denial of
fourteenth amendment due process of law, and that appointment of
counsel to represent the probationer is required in all cases. 5 The
court of appeals affirmed.6 The Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, held that due process requires that a probationer be
afforded both a preliminary and a final revocation hearing.7 Holding
further that the need for appointed counsel at revocation hearings is
to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis," the Court remanded for
determination of whether counsel should have been provided for
Scarpelli.
1. In July 1965, Scarpelli pleaded guilty to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin.
He was sentenced to serve 15 years imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended and
he was placed on probation for seven years. Under an interstate compact, he was allowed
to live in Illinois under the supervision of Illinois probation authorities. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 779 (1973).
2. The grounds for revocation were that Scarpelli had associated with known
criminals, an association expressly forbidden by his probation regulations, and that
he had been involved in and arrested for a burglary. Id. at 780.
3. At the conclusion of the trial, Scarpelli was sentenced and imposition of the
sentence was suspended. An alternative practice, whereby sentencing is deferred al-
together until probation is revoked, is within the ambit of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967), and thus outside the issue presented in Gagnon.
4. After the petition was filed, but prior to the time the petition was acted on,
the respondent was released on parole. The district court held that the action was not
moot since the revocation carried with it collateral consequences, "presumably including
the restraints imposed by his parole." See 411 U.S. at 780.
5. Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
6. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
7. 411 U.S. at 781-82. The Court was unanimous in its decision that the denial
of a revocation hearing constituted a denial of due process.
8. Id. at 783-91.
9. Id. at 791. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, would have required appoint-
CASE COMMENTS
Traditionally a probationer faced with the revocation of his con-
ditional liberty0 has been denied procedural safeguards on the theory
that probation is merely a privilege, not a constitutional right.11 The
principal authority for denying the existence of constitutional rights
attendant to probation lay in dicta in Escoe v. Zerbst,12 a 1935 Supreme
Court decision labeling probation "an act of grace." Analogizing to
this privilege concept, most courts have concluded that, since there
is no right to be placed on probation, there is consequently no right
to remain on probation. Furthermore, judicial reliance on the right-
privilege distinction has resulted in decisions holding that, like the
decision to grant probation, the manner in which probation is re-
voked is solely within the discretion of the state. Recognizing, how-
ever, that the right-privilege distinction can no longer be used to
deny constitutional rights, the Gagnon Court disposed of this argu-
ment by footnote.13
ment of counsel in this case. He focused on respondent's claim that the confession had
been given under duress. Id. Although Justice Douglas' opinion does not in unequivocal
terms explain his view of the appointment decision, his stand in Gagnon appears to
indicate agreement with the rationale utilized by the majority therein, and disagreement
only to the extent that the Court failed to require appointment. If this is the case,
the Douglas opinion in Gagnon is a departure from his dissenting statements in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 498 (1972), which indicated that counsel should in
every instance be appointed.
10. Probation may be defined as a grant of conditional liberty given to one con-
victed of a crime. While at liberty, a probationer is required to act in accordance
with certain standards of behavior established by and under the supervision of the
agency responsible for administration of probationers. For a general discussion of pro-
bation see S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDwARDs & S. ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTION 175-219 (1963); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 27-37 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as CORRECTIONS]. Probation may be differentiated from a suspended sentence in
that the latter generally requires no supervision. See F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIM-
BALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 741-43 (1969).
Probation provides the basic alternative to imprisonment for persons convicted of
felonies and serious misdemeanors; fines provide the primary alternative to imprison-
ment for those convicted of petty offenses. For discussion of the criteria for the im-
prisonment-or-alternative decision, see F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED PROCESSES 912-45 (1971); CORRECTIONS
38-44. While probation is the basic alternative to imprisonment, it is not the only
one. Recent developments in prison alternatives are sketched in CORRECrIONS 38-44.
11. See generally Van Alystne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
12. 295 U.S. 490 (1935). While interpreting the Federal Probation Act, Justice
Cardozo explained that "we do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege
[of hearing] has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute." Id. at 492. Years
earlier, the Supreme Court similarly had stated that parole itself was a privilege. See
Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
13. 411 U.S. at 782 n.4. The Gagnon Court relied on the authority of Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), to dispense with the "act of grace" proposition. In Morrissey
1974]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court specifically rejected the contention, prompted by its
opinion in Mempa v. Rhay,14 that revocation of probation, absent
sentencing, is a critical stage of the prosecution. Rather, the Court
drew heavily upon Morrissey v. Brewer," wherein Chief Justice Burger
had observed that, while revocation of parole is not a critical stage,
the loss of liberty accompanying parole revocation is a serious depriva-
tion requiring that the parolee be accorded due process.' 6 Vhile noting
that practical distinctions exist between probation and parole, the
Court in Gagnon concluded that for due process purposes no distinc-
tion may be drawn between parole and probation revocation pro-
ceedings.17 Thus, due process also must be satisfied when the state
seeks to revoke probation.
the Court established that the right-privilege distinction was no longer creditable in
regard to the rights of a parolee. The initial demise of the doctrine may be found in
cases in which the realization of a benefit or status was conditioned upon an implied
or explicit agreement by the beneficiary of the agreement to forbear in the exercise
of some right expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (freedom of religion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (freedom
of speech).
A second method of attacking the right-privilege distinction is found in cases in
which the petitioner alleges a "chilling effect" on a constitutional right, and the state
advances no state interest that outweighs the constitutional infringements. See, e.g.,
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (freedom of expression and association); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association).
Yet a third method of avoiding the privilege concept is based upon an assertion that
procedural due process must be afforded in determining whether violation of a condi-
tion, upon which the continued existence of the privilege depends, has occurred. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
14. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). In Mempa the Court held that a combined sentencing and
probation revocation hearing is a critical stage of the prosecution requiring that counsel
be appointed. Id. While interpreting a Florida procedure by which probation revocation
and sentencing occurred in bifurcated hearings, one court in reliance on Mempa wrote
that "[c]ertainly the decision to deprive a probationer of his freedom is as critical as
the subsequent imposition of sentence." Gargan v. State, 217 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
15. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
16. The Court reasoned that
[p]arole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of
sentence. . . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly de-
pendent on observance of special parole restrictions.
Id. at 480.
17. 411 U.S. at 782 & n.3. While the Court recognized that no distinctions relevant to
due process exist, there are practical distinctions between parole and probation. Generally,
a probationer will not have served any part of his sentence in actual confinement, whereas
a parolee will have obtained his conditional liberty only after serving some part of his
sentence. Secondly, the decision to grant or revoke probation is a judicial one, usually
made by the trial court, but the decision to grant and revoke parole is an administrative
one, made by a parole commission. Finally, while probation may be viewed as a cor-
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In Morrissey the Court determined that when the state attempts
to revoke parole, due process mandates that two hearings be provided.",
First, a preliminary hearing must be convened to determine whether
probable cause exists to revoke liberty. Probable cause arises when
a subsequent crime is committed or when a violation of conditions
occurs. The final hearing, which occurs only if probable cause is
first established, focuses upon the question of whether revocation and
reincarceration is the appropriate sanction for the proved violation.
In reaching this discretionary decision, the hearing body considers both
the nature of the violation and any mitigating evidence that might
make revocation inappropriate. Based upon its initial determination
that due process considerations are involved when the State seeks to
revoke probation, the Court applied the Morrissey rationale to require
that these same two hearings be provided for probationers. 19
rectional alternative to institutionalization, parole may be considered as a correctional
alternative to continued institutionalization.
Despite these differences, both parole and probation serve the same purpose-to re-
habilitate the individual. Probationers and parolees alike are subject to supervision, sur-
veillance and conditions, and for both the correctional arena is the community. See Van
Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 1215, 1241-43 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation
Hearings, 55 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 175, 198 n.182 (1964).
18. 408 U.S. at 485-90.
19. 411 U.S. at 782. With regard to the preliminary hearing, the Court stated in
Morrissey that "due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be con-
ducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and
as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are avail-
able." 408 U.S. at 485. While these requirements seem clear enough, those terms that
are subjective may provide troublesome questions. For example, what is "reasonably
near"? By way of dictum one court indicated that the answer is dependent upon "con-
sideration of all the circumstances." Richardson v. Board of Parole, 341 N.Y.S.2d 825,
828 (App. Div. 1973). Further definition of the "prompt hearing" requirement also
may be necessary.
In Gagnon the Court viewed this preliminary hearing as having five components:
"notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an opportunity to appear and
to present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses,
an independent decisionmaker, and a written report of the hearing." 411 U.S. at 786.
The final hearing to determine whether revocation is the proper rehabilitative dis-
position embraces six procedural elements. First, "written notice of the claimed viola-
tions of parole [or probation]" must be provided. 408 U.S. at 489. This requirement
needs refinement at two points. First, what degree of particularity of the charges must
be provided? One court has offered the following answer:
While the allegations in a motion to revoke do not require the same particularity
of an indictment or an information, in all fairness, the allegations as to a violation
of probation should be fully and clearly set forth in the revocation motion and a
copy timely served on the probationer so that he might be informed as to that
upon which he will be called to defend.
Kuenstler v. State, 486 S.W.2d 367, 368-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also Richardson
v. State, 487 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
Additionally, the question arises as to what is sufficient notice for the probationer
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or parolee adequately to prepare a defense. Obviously the answer is dependent upon
the individual circumstances. In one case two-day notice was held to be a denial of due
process "by the failure to give ...adequate and prior notice to enable [the probationer]
to prepare his defense." Kuenstler v. State, supra at 370. But one-day written notice
was held to be sufficient where the parolee previously had been put on notice (orally)
that a hearing would be conducted within the next two weeks. See People ex rel. Calloway
v. Skinner, 337 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1972), afj'd, 341 N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Div. 1973). An-
other court found that one-day notice, absent prior oral notice, was violative of the fair
notice principle. People ex rel. Angell v. Lynch, 337 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
Due process, secondly, requires "disclosure to the parolee [or probationer] of evidence
against him." 408 U.S. at 489. That this requirement has not spawned litigation based
upon failure to disclose may be indicative of compliance with the requirement.
The third component required by due process is "opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence." Id. Here again, the
lack of cases on this point probably indicates substantial compliance. In Gagnon the
Court explained this requirement in greater detail. Addressing the problem of difficulty
and expense of procuring witnesses who reside at great distances from the place of the
hearing, the Court wrote:
While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony,
we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where ap-
propriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits,
depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States
from holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation
or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the
Morrissey requirements.
411 U.S. at 783 n.5.
Morrissey provides as a fourth requirement "the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses." 408 U.S. at 489. But this is not an unconditional right. The hearing
officer may for good cause refuse to allow confrontation. Id. This refusal is usually
predicated upon fears of reprisal by the probationer or parolee against the witness and
by additional concern that if a witness expected disclosure of his identity, he would
refrain from providing information. These fears, although similarly present, have not
been suggested to deny the right of confrontation at criminal trials. See Sklar, supra
note 17, at 195. Moreover, the opportunity for spurious allegations against probationers
or parolees will be substantial if such informants go unidentified. "Faceless informers,"
according to Justice Douglas, "are often effective if they need not take the stand."
Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41, 43 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
As a corrollary to the right to confront witnesses, the Florida Supreme Court has
stated that the hearing body has "no right to treat as evidence material not introduced
as such or to consider any information outside the record in its disposition of the
case." Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1954) (relying in part on a Florida
statute); cf. Senk v. Cochran, 116 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1959).
The fifth due process requirement is " a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such
as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers." 408
U.S. at 489. This type of hearing body is necessary to avoid the possibility of revocation
based solely upon the opinion of the supervisor, who through mistake or prejudice may
seek revocation unnecessarily. See 411 U.S. at 785.
The sixth and last element of the final hearing is "a written statement by the fact-
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole [or probation]."
408 U.S. at 489. One court has interpreted this language to require that the reasons
stated in the report must be sufficient to establish grounds for revocation. Garcia v.
State, 488 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also People ex rel. Angell v. Lynch,
supra.
The Seventh Circuit has created an additional procedural safeguard by granting
parolees the right to object prior to final adoption of the order. See Zizzo v. United States,
(Vol. 2
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The Court then addressed a more complex issue, which its Mempa
decision had beclouded and its Morrissey opinion had specifically re-
fused to reach;20 namely, "whether an indigent probationer or parolee
470 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1972). In Zizzo the court construed Morrissey to imply
that the written statement must be made known to the parolee, and it would
seem logical to us, where the statement is first tentatively compiled by a single
officer and later adopted by a board, it must be made known to the parolee,
and he given an opportunity to object by written submission before adoption.
Id. at 108.
Neither the Morrissey nor the Gagnon decision speaks to the burden of proof
standard to be utilized at the revocation hearings. As a result, varying standards have
been developed. One court has stated that at a revocation hearing, unlike a criminal
trial, there is no presumption of innocence. See People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, supra
at 41. "[W]e are dealing here with people who have been convicted of a crime. There
is no presumption of innocence attached. That presumption has long since disappeared.
In its place we have criminals who now seek to enjoy the same privileges that they
enjoyed before they were adjudicated such." Id.; accord, United States ex rel. Mason v.
Amico, 360 F. Supp. 1344, 1345 (W.D.N.Y. 1973). Another court has stated that "[a]ll
that is required is that the grounds for revocation be clearly and satisfactorily shown.
They need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ruelas, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 134 (Ct. App. 1973).
Generally, the burden of going forward with evidence of probation or parole viola-
tions is upon the board. See Tinsley v. Board of Parole, 342 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct.
1973), where the court wrote: "[W]here no evidence is presented by the parole board
which has the burden of going forward in the face of a denial of the charges, a re-
vocation cannot be sustained." Id. at 266; accord, People ex rel. Warren v. Mancusi, 332
N.Y.S.2d 442 (Wyoming County Ct. 1971), aff'd, 339 N.Y.S.2d 882 (App. Div. 1973);
cf. Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1954).
For additional analysis of the Morrissey decision and the hearing requirements, see
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 95 (1972); Note, An Endorsement
of Due Process Reform in Parole Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 LOYOLA U.L.A.L.
REV. 157 (1973).
20. As to the problems flowing from the failure of the Mempa decision to enunciate
clearly the scope of its decision, see note 22 infra. In Morrissey, the Court failed to reach
two questions; namely, " 'whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained
counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent.' " 411 U.S. at 783 n.6, quoting from
408 U.S. at 489. Of course, the Gagnon decision answers the latter half of this question-
whether a right to appointed counsel exists. As to the former half-whether there is a
general right to retained counsel at revocation hearings-the Court has yet to provide
an answer.
In Morrissey, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurring, wrote that
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), plainly dictates that when parole revocation
hearings occur, a parolee "at least 'must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so
desires.' " 408 U.S. at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring), quoting from 397 U.S. at 270. At
least one other justice agrees that a right to retained counsel exists. See 408 U.S. at
498 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Yet another question remains unanswered concerning the right to counsel at revoca-
tion hearings. This question, based upon the equal protection clause, is whether an
indigent has a right to appointed counsel whenever, through either judicial ruling
or statutory provision, there exists a right to retained counsel. This issue was litigated
in Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269 (5th Cir.), vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973). Cottle
was a parolee under the supervision of the Florida Parole Commission. On two occa-
sions he was arrested and convicted of public drunkenness. The Florida Parole Commis-
sion, on the basis of these two convictions, sought to revoke his parole. Hearings were
1974)
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has a due process right to be represented by appointed counsel at [re-
vocation] hearings."'" Many lower courts, in reliance upon the Su-
preme Court's Mempa opinion, had held that a combined sentencing
and probation revocation hearing is a critical stage of the prosecution
requiring the appointment of counsel.2 2 But the Gagnon Court con-
then undertaken to obtain such determination. FLA. STAT. § 947.23 (1971) provides that
at such hearings the parolee, if he so desires, may be represented by counsel. Cottle
appeared at the hearing alone because he was indigent. The Commission, over Cottle's
denials of guilt, revoked his parole.
Cottle petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that "the failure of the state to appoint counsel to
represent him at his parole hearing constituted a denial of equal protection." 477 F.2d
at 271. The District Court agreed with Cottle and ordered that "at any subsequent
parole revocation hearing Cottle should be afforded the services of counsel." Id.; see
Cottle v. Wainwright, 338 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that Cottle's equal protection
claim was valid:
While absolute equality between rich and poor is not required by the Constitu-
tion, we think that indigent parolees at least are entitled to as adequate a parole
revocation hearing as those who have means, and in this respect representation
by counsel is likely to be of substantial importance to the poor as well
as the rich. The very fact that the Florida Legislature has seen fit to permit
representation by counsel, at least to non-indigents, we think attests to its
efficacy.
477 F.2d at 272.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the judgment and remanded
the case "for further consideration in light of Gaguon v. Scarpelli." Wainwright v.
Cottle, 94 S. Ct. 221 (1973). But Gagnon had been decided on due process considerations,
no equal protection challenge having been made. Therefore the Court's summary dis-
position shed no light on the merit of Cottle's equal protection argument. Justice
Douglas, with whom Justice Blackmun concurred, expressed his dismay at the Court's
disposition of Cottle:
[T]he only issue in this case is whether the court below was correct in holding that
the Equal Protection Clause requires the right to appointed counsel at parole
revocation hearings in cases where, unlike Gagnon v. Scarpelli . . . a solvent
parolee has a statutory right to the presence of retained counsel. Gagnon is in-
apposite. . . . Whether in such cases the Equal Protection Clause demands that
indigent parolees be afforded the same representation rights was not answered
in Gagnon.
Id.
21. 411 U.S. at 783.
22. See 389 U.S. at 133-34. Arising from the cryptic Mempa opinion were two
problems. First, was there a right to appointed counsel at a revocation hearing at which
no new sentence was imposed? A majority of post-Mempa decisions did not view the
imposition of a new sentence as essential to the right and, instead, required the appoint-
ment of counsel whenever probation was revoked. See, e.g., Hewett v. North Carolina,
415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); Gargan v. State, 217 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Herrington v. State, 207 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Holiday, 153
N.W.2d 855, modified, 155 N.W.2d 378 (Neb. 1967); cf. State v. Brusenhan, 438 P.2d 174
(N.M. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Saavedra, 253 A.2d 677 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1968). However,
a substantial number of courts emphasized the act of sentencing and held that where
no new sentence is imposed, no right to counsel exists. See, e.g., Shaw v. Henderson,
430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Cole v. Holliday. 171 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1969); State
[Vol. 2
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cluded that a revocation hearing, absent sentencing, is not a critical
stage, and indicated that a right to appointed counsel could not be
predicated upon the Mempa rationale. Rather, the Court focused
upon the distinctive nature of probation and parole.
Probation and parole are typically characterized as benevolent
alternatives to incarceration, designed to rehabilitate those under
supervision. 23 The probation or parole officer generally represents his
client's best interests, as long as those interests do not constitute a
threat to the equally important goal of community safety. However,
when the rehabilitative program is unsuccessful, the field officer's
attitude of "benevolent supervision" may be modified. Upon
recommending revocation, the officer can no longer be considered
dedicated to what the probationer or parolee would call his best
interests. Assuming this characterization, 24 the Court noted that the
hearings it had mandated were necessary to overcome any bias or error
on the part of the field officer and to provide an impartial consideration
of the revocation decision. While these hearings usually will prevent
ill-considered revocation, the Court surmised that in some instances
"the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have
difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where
the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses
or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence."2 1
When such a situation occurs, the assistance of counsel is necessary
to satisfy due process. -6
However, the recognition that counsel must in some instances be
appointed did not lead the Court to accept Scarpelli's contention that
ex rel. Thompson v. Henderson, 239 So. 2d 347 (La. 1970); Skidgell v. State, 264 A.2d
8 (Me. 1970). The second problem related to the Mempa decision was whether the
rationale of that decision applied to the parole revocation situation. A probable majority
of jurisdictions refused to extend Mempa to the parolee's situation, relying largely on
the rationale that parole revocation could not be denominated as a "critical stage."
See, e.g., Johnson v. Stucker, 453 P.2d 35 (Kan. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969);
Snedeker v. Wingo, 453 S.W.2d 552 (Ky. 1970); John v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37 (N. Dak.
1968); Beal v. Turner, 454 P.2d 624 (Utah 1969); cf. Lincoln v. Adult Auth., 435 F.2d 133
(9th Cir. 1970); Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1970); Menechino v.
Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. HaIprin v. Parker, 418 F.2d
313 (3d Cir. 1969); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968). Nevertheless, a sub-
stantial number of cases found Mempa apposite and required appointment. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Bey v. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Tinson, 249 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1969); cf. People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 267
N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
23. See F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 806-14, 910-11 (1969).
24. See 411 U.S. at 783-87.
25. Id. at 787.
26. Id.
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counsel must always be appointed. Viewing flexibility as essential to
the rehabilitative process and permissible under due process, the
Court instead stated that the state agency responsible for parole and
probation administration is to make the appointment decision on a
case-by-case basis. 27 Characterizing any attempt to formulate precise
guidelines as "neither possible nor prudent," the Court stated only
that, presumptively, counsel should be provided when, after being
apprised of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee
makes such a request, coupled with a timely and colorable claim that
he is innocent of the alleged violation. Even when the violation is un-
controverted, counsel nevertheless might be necessary if factors
mitigating or justifying the violation exist, and if those factors "are
complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present."28 Additionally,
the probationer's or parolee's ability to speak effectively for himself
should be of paramount concern to the appointment decision.
In effect, the hearing body will have absolute discretion over the
appointment decision. It will determine whether a claim is "timely"
or "colorable." The body will also decide, without exposition by
counsel of the probationer's or parolee's position, whether mitigating
considerations are complex or difficult to present. Traditionally, ap-
pellate review of such discretionary determinations has resulted in
reversal only upon an abuse of discretion.
2 9
The Court did attempt to provide some protection against abuse
of discretion by requiring, for purposes of review, a written statement
of reasons for denial of appointed counsel.s° However, it is difficult
to understand why a hearing body that decides counsel is unnecessary
would provide reasons for its decision which, when reviewed, would
evince an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, several observers have
recognized the virtual impossibility of determining when a particular
revocation proceeding will be sufficiently complex to require appoint-
ment of counsel.31 It would appear, then, that under the case-by-case
approach to the appointment decision very few denials will ever be
disturbed on appeal.
27. Id. at 790.
28. Id.
29. Cf. Mullen v. Mullen, 122 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
30. 411 U.S. at 791.
31. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PROBATION § 5.4, Commentary at 68 (Approved Draft 1970). When faced with the
issue of appointment of counsel at revocation hearings, one court adopted the Gagnon
case-by-case approach, but in doing so wrote: "[A]rticulation of where the line should
be drawn between those who should have been supplied with counsel and those
lawfully refused such assistance is a most difficult undertaking." Bearden v. South
Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090, 1095 (4th Cir. 1971); cf. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S.
443 (1962).
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A similar ad hoc approach to appointment of counsel was adopted
by the Court in Betts v. Brady.32 The Betts "totality of circumstances"
test for the desirability of counsel in state felony prosecutions was
later rejected in Gideon v. Wainwright3 since it had proved ineffective
in providing for appointment when necessary. Gideon recognized that
no reviewing court can examine a hearing record and divine with
any precision whether the petitioner was denied an adequate defense
by lack of counsel.3 4 Recognizing this earlier failure, the Gagnon Court
attempted to bolster its decision by stating that the inadequacy of
the rule as applied to criminal trials does not necessarily indicate that
the same rule will be inadequate when applied to non-criminal and
discretionary probation or parole hearings. Focusing on the differences
between criminal and non-criminal proceedings, the Court indicated
that the need for counsel in the former case derives principally from
the adversary nature of a criminal trial and from the need for presen-
tation of facts before untrained jurors. A revocation proceeding, on
the other hand, is conducted before a body well-versed in parole or
probation matters, and the state is represented not by an adversary,
but by a probation or parole officer whose principal interest is re-
habilitation.35 Therefore, the Court concluded, "[tlhe need for counsel
at revocation hearings derives, not from the invariable attributes of
those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular cases."3 6
Unfortunately, the Court's characterization of the "rehabilitative
ideal" may not be an accurate assessment of the real-world context
in which most revocation hearings occur. A candid appraisal of the
parole and probation systems reveals that rehabilitation generally re-
mains an unachieved goal.37 Indeed, the "rehabilitative" process in
32. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
34. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 31, at 68.
35. The Court stated that "the State is represented not by a prosecutor but by a
parole officer with the orientation described above." 411 U.S. at 789. In this context,
the "orientation" referred to must be the officer's role as counsellor acting in the best
interests of the parolee or probationer. Previously, however, the Court justified the
requirement of a revocation hearing by emphasizing that, in spite of rehabilitative
orientation, once the decision to revoke has been made, the officer's "role as counsellor
• . . is then surely compromised." Id. at 785. Curiously, while this relationship was
sufficiently adversary to justify a revocation hearing, it was at the same time sufficiently
non-adversary to justify rejection of an absolute rule for the appointment of counsel.
36. 411 U.S. at 789. This analysis, however, seems to presuppose the answer.
37. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANPOWER
AND TRAINING 29-30 (Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training 1969)
[hereinafter cited as COHEN]; Rubin, The Model Sentencing Act, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 251
(1964); Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1968).
It is important to stress the dichotomy between the professed objectives-treat-
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some instances has proved harmful.a5 Implicit in the Court's analysis
are the presumptions that the field officer charged with supervision
is sufficiently trained and that the magnitude of his caseload does
not preclude adequate supervision of his clients. Neither of these pre-
sumptions is correct. Only a small number of supervisors possess even
the minimum desirable education or on-the-job training.39 Typical
caseloads are often twice the manageable number.40 Further, parole
and probation systems remain severely underfunded, 41 resulting in
ment and rehabilitation-and the actual uses made of probation . . . For a
variety of reasons, many of them traceable to a lack of community and political
support, probation supervision is more a process of verification of the probation-
er's behavior than it is a process of modification of the probationer's be-
havior. In any event, the circumstances under which probation may be granted,
the conditions that are likely to be imposed, and the paucity and allocation
of existing resources make it clear that probation is actually used to achieve
objectives other than treatment and rehabilitation.
Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
38. See Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRiM. L.C.
& P.S. 153 (1966). An analysis of 100 correctional outcome reports revealed that in almost
one-quarter of the studies the correctional process resulted in either harmful effects or
no effect at all. Id. at 156.
39. Minimally, the probation officer, if he is effectively to serve a rehabilitative
purpose, should possess a college education with heavy emphasis on behavioral or
social sciences. The preferred standard of training is completion of graduate study in
social work. Of 250 counties surveyed, 35% reported that they had no educational
requirements at all or required only a high school education. Remarkably, less than
1% of all counties require graduate study by their probation officers. See CoRuEcoNs
174-76.
Similarly, the survey revealed that 21 states have no educational minimum or require
only that prospective parole officers hold a high school diploma. In-service training
does not exist in 23 states, and only in four or five states is in-service training seriously
and systematically pursued. Id. at 190.
In-service training programs for probation workers exist in only 51% of the
surveyed counties. Of those counties that have programs, only 37% have training as
frequently as once a month. CORRECrMoNS 174-75.
40. The manageable caseload of a probation officer is defined as 50 work units
(a probationer under supervision constitutes one "unit"; each presentence investigation
per month constitutes five "units"). Yet, 96.9% of felony probationers under supervision
are handled by officers with caseloads in excess of that standard, and 67.05% of those
cases are a part of caseloads of over 100 work units, double the standard. The average
caseload is 103.8. CORRMc-rIONS 173-74.
The caseload of parole officers, though not as unmanageable as that of probation
officers, is on the average in excess of the recommended 50 work units. Only 8% of
all parolees are part of supervision caseloads of 50 or less, while 19% are part of
caseloads over 90. Id. at 189-90.
The impact of such overly burdensome caseloads on the supervisor's ability to pro-
vide close personal supervision is obvious. One writer persuasively suggests that super-
vision under these conditions cannot be viewed as supervision resulting in modified re-
habilitated behavior; such conditions produce only a scheme of behavioral verification.
Diana, What is Probation?, 51 J. CaLM. L.C. & P.S. 189, 202 (1960).
41. See COHEN 30. "The national profile of corrections reveals that about 80 per-
cent of all 'correctional' costs are expended on institutions, with 14.4 percent of all
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insufficient institutional resources and research and, thus, a widening
of the gap between potential and achieved rehabilitation. 42 In view of
these facts, it is difficult to comprehend how a hearing body, in deter-
mining whether to revoke probation or parole, can assess realistically
an individual's demonstrated progress toward rehabilitation. Rather,
it would seem that the determination is more likely to turn upon the
narrower question of whether specific acts of the probationer or parolee
reflect a sufficient propensity for crime or violence to warrant his
removal from society. In this context, then, it cannot be said that
there is no adversary relationship between the state and a parolee or
probationer when the latter disputes a claimed violation. 43
Moreover, the parens patriae 44 characterization of revocation pro-
ceedings has been criticized in recent years4 5 particularly in light of
the Court's decision in In re Gault.'6 In extending due process rights to
juveniles the Gault Court rejected the contention that, because of
the parens patriae relationship between the state and the child, only
informal safeguards were necessary to satisfy due process at juvenile
court proceedings. Conceding that rehabilitation was the major goal of
the juvenile court system, the Court nevertheless found the gap be-
tween professed purpose and actual achievement sufficiently wide to
costs going to probation and only 3.5 going to adult parole." Id., citing CORRECTIONS 115-
212.
42. See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
From Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REv. I, 29-30 (1968).
43. As Cohen puts it:
The point of all this is not to discredit probation and parole but to demonstrate
the fallacy-engendered by the benevolent purpose doctrine [rehabilitative attitude)
-of drawing conclusions about the need for legal safeguards in corrections from
a conceptually inaccurate description of the goals of corrections and from a
factually inaccurate description of their accomplishments.
COHEN 31.
44. The term is used to refer to the state's sovereign power of guardianship over
persons under a disability. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (4th rev. ed. 1968). The
classic example is that of state and child. The concept was applied to the parole
revocation situation by Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger in Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963):
[T]here is a genuine identity of interest if not purpose in the prisoner's desire
to be released and the Board's policy to grant release as soon as possible. Here
there is not the attitude of adverse, conflicting objectives as between the parolee
and the Board inherent between prosecution and defense in a criminal case.
Here we do not have pursuer and quarry but a relationship partaking of parens
patriae. In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking parole occupies the role of
parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child ....
45. Van Dyke, supra note 17, at 1246.
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For arguments applying Gault to all parens patriae relation-
ships, see Van Dyke, supra note 17. at 1246-48; note 48 infra; to corrections generally,
see COHEN 3-4.
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require imposition of constitutional safeguards on those proceedings.47
Assuming the existence of a similar gap between purpose and goals
of probation and parole, a strong case can be made for extending
constitutional safeguards to revocation proceedings as well. s
The Court did concede that, even in a rehabilitative atmosphere,
"under a case-by-case approach there may be cases in which a lawyer
would be useful but in which none would be appointed because an
arguable defense would be uncovered only by a lawyer."4 9 Thus, un-
warranted reincarceration might sometimes result, the antithesis of
the rehabilitative goals of the probation and parole systems. The Court
justified this potentiality, however, by stating that "we deal here, not
with the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but
with the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer
or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime." 50 In a foot-
note, the Court rationalized with the same statement the differing
treatment of juveniles and "differently situated" probationers or
parolees 1.5
The Court's belief that counsel generally could provide no con-
structive contribution to either revocation hearing was central to its
rejection of a per se rule-requiring appointment of counsel in every
instance-in favor of a case-by-case approach. In determining whether
a violation of conditions had occurred, the Court argued, counsel
usually would be non-contributive because in most cases the "proba-
tioner or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime
or has admitted the charges against him."5 2 Likewise, counsel is usually
unnecessary at the final hearing, where appropriateness of revocation
47. 387 U.S. at 17-20. "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure." Id. at 18.
48. One author has framed the argument thus:
Gault must extend to all parens patriae relationships where there is a possibility
of incarceration, because the essence of Gault is that even in the most classic of
the parens patriae relationships-that of state and child-certain procedural safe-
guards heretofore associated with strictly adversary proceedings are constitution-
ally required. Without question the state-parolee relationship is inherently more
adversary than is that of state-child. Therefore, if the right to counsel is to be
extended to the latter it is a fortiori required to be extended to the former.
Van Dyke, supra note 17, at 1247. It must be noted, however, that the Court in Gagnon
distinguished the juvenile's situation from that of the parolee or probationer. See note 51
and accompanying text infra.
49. 411 U.S. at 789.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 789 n.12, stating: "A juvenile charged with violation of a generally
applicable statute is differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee,
and is entitled to a higher degree of protection."
52. Id. at 787.
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is determined, since any mitigating evidence justifying a violation of
conditions "is often not susceptible of proof or is so simple as not
to require either investigation or exposition by counsel."55 In addi-
tion, the Court suggested that the presence of counsel would produce
detrimental alterations in the nature of the hearing process, and
would increase substantially the costs to the state.5 4 The Court feared
the adversary atmosphere that surely would arise from the presence
of counsel would result in the hearing body's becoming "more akin
to . . . a judge at trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs
of the individual probationer or parolee." 55 Indeed, the Court believed
that this adversariness might result in a higher rate of reincarceration
because of the hearing body's "greater self-consciousness of its quasi-
judicial role." '56
But the Court's view of the detrimental effects of counsel is not
shared by all who have considered the issue. Congress has required
the presence of counsel at all federal probation revocation hearings. 5 7
By statute ten jurisdictions authorize the retention of counsel by pro-
bationers or parolees5s and, in a national survey, over half the jurisdic-
tions responding indicated that retained counsel would be permitted
at the hearing.5 9 The American Bar Association has recommended that
a probationer be accorded a revocation hearing with "representation
by retained or appointed counsel. ' ' 60 If counsel can in fact be contribu-
53. Id.
54. "[T]he financial cost to the State-for appointed counsel, counsel for the State,
a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review-will not be insubstantial." Id. at
788.
55. Id. at 787-88.
56. Id. at 788.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970) provides in relevant part:
(b) Appointment of counsel-. .. In every criminal case in which the defendant
is charged with a felony or misdemeanor . . . or with a violation of probation
and appears without counsel, the United States magistrate or the court shall
advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by counsel and
that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to
obtain counsel.
58. See Sklar, supra note 17, at 181-82. Those jurisdictions granting counsel to
parolees, probationers or both are Alabama (parole), District of Columbia (parole),
Florida (both), Georgia (probation), Michigan (parole), Minnesota (probation), Mon-
tana (parole), Washington (parole) and West Virginia (parole). Id.
59. Sklar, supra note 17, at 192-93. Thirty-six (69%) jurisdictions responded re-
garding parole while 55 (90%) jurisdictions responded regarding probation. Id. at 191
n.132. Almost all jurisdictions reporting on probation indicated that retained counsel
would be permitted but only slightly over half indicated that counsel would be as-
signed for indigents. Id. at 193. No jurisdictions indicated that counsel would be as-
signed to an indigent parolee. Id. at 192.
60. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRO-
BATION § 5.4(a)(ii) (Approved Draft 1970). The ABA argues that a case-by-case approach
is insufficient since
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tive, as Congress, many states and the ABA apparently believe, rejec-
tion of a per se appointment rule should not be based solely on the
rationale of administrative efficiency.61 Increased adversariness, longer
hearings and higher costs, while likely to occur, may not be significant
6 2
and do not themselves justify denial of due process rights. Implicit in
the approval of a right to counsel at revocation hearings is the recogni-
tion that the benefits of counsel's presence would outweigh the burdens
imposed on the hearing process. Thus, if the Court erred in its initial
evaluation of the need for counsel, its additional objections to the
presence of counsel do not seem sufficient to justify rejection of a
per se appointment rule.
While a probationer or parolee must always be afforded a revoca-
tion hearing, the appointment of counsel at the hearing remains a
matter of discretion. But the Court's characterization of the nature
of the hearing process appears to be more theoretical than real. Much
of the benefit gained by a probationer or parolee through a revocation
hearing therefore may be lost, because the assistance of counsel,
probably helpful and sometimes necessary, will not always be avail-
able .63
[t]here is always-at least on the judgmental question involved in every case, if
not on whether the violation in fact occurred-the potentiality of prejudice which
cannot be weighed or assessed in retrospect.
Id. at 68. The ABA adopts the view that exactly the same considerations involved in
the criminal trial and sentencing stage of the original prosecution are involved in
the two-stage revocation proceeding, and that, therefore, counsel is not only contributive
but necessary at this latter stage. Id. at 68-69. For further discussion of this view, see
Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45
MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961).
61. See Van Dyke, supra note 17, at 1252.
62. The adversariness may already be present. See COHEN 30-31. In California in 1968,
the increase in cost for appointed counsel for the 4,404 parolees who had their parole
suspended or revoked at revocation hearings would have been quite insignificant when
compared to the cost of appointing counsel for the estimated 500,000 indigents who re-
quired appointed counsel at trial. Van Dyke, supra note 17, at 1252-53.
63. In Florida, the probationer's or parolee's right to a revocation hearing is
assured both statutorily and judicially. Moreover, a probationer or parolee is statutorily
entitled to retained counsel at that hearing. See FLA. S-rAT. § 947.23(1) (1971) (parole);
FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1) (1971) (probation); Keller v. Epperson, 265 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1972);
Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1954) (parole, relying in part on the above statute).
Due in large part to Mempa v. Rhay, however, the Florida courts have yet to answer
adequately the question of whether an indigent has a right to appointed counsel at a
parole or probation revocation hearing. The Florida Supreme Court has never been
faced with the issue.
Florida courts as late as 1964 stated that there was no constitutional mandate re-
quiring appointment of counsel for indigent probationers, since the revocation hearing
was not considered a "crucial step" in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Phillips v. State,
165 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Thomas v. State, 163 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964). When sentencing occurred simultaneously with the revocation
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